As if the threat of international terrorism isn’t enough to keep the Homeland quaking in fear, now we have a new threat to be afraid of. The United States Embassy in Indonesia, the nation that has the world’s largest Muslim population, is warning American travellers that stray cats there may be a deadly threat.
It has been shown that a few stray cats have gotten bird flu from eating infected birds, you see. And, although there has never been a case anywhere in the world of a human being getting bird flu from a stray cat, the U.S. Embassy officials in Jakarta want you to be on the lookout anyway.
I put this warning on the plausability level of the claim by Fox News that any Indonesian school with a majority Muslim student population can be regarded as a madrassa teaching radical anti-American Islamic jihadism. Children in a foreign country being educated is the best we can do these days for a Homeland Security panic. Oh wait, we also do have people in Boston warning us that electronically lit signs showing cartoon characters could be bombs. Can we never feel safe again?
How sad that the once virulent H5N1 panic has been reduced to this: That, if you visit Indonesia and happen to come in contact with a stray cat that might have the bird flu, you might get sick, though such a thing has never happened before. Bird flu is going to get you? I’m not rushing out to get a can of Cat Begone just yet.
I came to this post (and your other bird ‘flu ones) by way of your Bird Flu Panic shop, which I found while browsing Irregular Goods for buttons and stickers.
First, my quals: I have a Ph.D. in archaeology, I think evolution is a far better explanation than creation, and it’s just as well that I was brought up in the Episcopal Church because I’m basically an agnostic with a sentimental attachment to the Christian tradition. I also work (as a non-profit version of a graduate assistant) in an office full of biologists.
All of that said, I am puzzled by your apparent dismissiveness of the potential H5N1 threat.
Now, granted: H5N1 is not epidemic in humans; it is not, so far as is known, easily transmitted from non-humans to humans, nor from humans to humans (which seems to be why it is not epidemic).
On the other hand, the mortality among humans who do contract it is fairly high. And although mutations that improve the transmissibility of a ‘flu virus usually also reduce its virulence, this is not always the case, as is known all-too-well from the 1916 Spanish ‘flu. I do not understand the details, but the genetic similarities between the 1916 virus and H5N1 are such that, with the right mutations, H5N1 could turn 1916 on us. And the 1916 strain was unusually virulent: it killed quickly, and, for reasons that remain unclear, it preferentially infected healthy adults (the people most likely to be out & about in public) rather than the very young, old, or infirm. *That* is why epidemiologists in the U.S. are nervous and epidemiologists in SE Asia are downright scared (many no longer eat poultry).
Of course, there is no guarantee that the necessary mutations will ever occur. But H5N1 is a bit different from Y2K in that there was a deadline for Y2K. There is no deadline for H5N1. For all we know, it will never become epidemic. But there is no way of knowing that. We can’t even say when a time will come that that danger will have passed.
Part of the concern is also the logistics of ‘flu control. It takes about 9 months to get a ‘flu vaccine into distribution. (Yes, this means that each winter’s ‘flu shot was developed the previous spring, meaning that they are based on *educated guesses* about what 3 strains seemed likely to be most prevalent the following winter.) What with air travel and public transit (of which I am a great fan, and use every day), a virulent strain could be spread almost as quickly as news of its emergence, meaning that containment would be nearly impossible, and vaccination virtually impossible.
Moreover, there is not enough ‘flu-vaccine production capacity in the world to protect BOTH people at an outbreak location AND citizens of the countries with the vaccine production facilities. There is not, in fact, enough production capacity even to vaccinate every citizen in vaccine-capable countries. So guess who stands to miss out? The countries with the greatest likelihood of an outbreak, of course: which, because of the ease of travel, are also the best places for trying to contain any such outbreaks. Indonesia has stopped providing samples of H5N1 to the World Health Organization (which samples are essential for keeping tabs on H5N1 evolution) until it gets a legally binding agreement that its samples will not be used to make an expensive vaccine.
Then, of course, there is the cost. The politicians are reluctant to spend money on a threat that may never develop. But if they wait until it does, it will be too late.
There are other considerations, too, about which I am poorly informed, such as the degree to which Tamiflu (for example) can reduce the intensity of bird ‘flu one contracted, and Tamiflu supply logistics. (I do know that Tamiflu won’t be a panacea, but I don’t know the details.)
I will grant that much of this information isn’t to be found in the mainstream media. But from what I’ve seen, it’s not so much that the media’s coverage has been incorrect as that it has been (vastly) incomplete. And, yes, none of the small outbreaks of bird ‘flu has developed into anything of international significance. Still, news of clusters of bird ‘flu deaths makes epidemiologists anxious because that’s how “the” outbreak is likely to begin. Epidemiologists don’t see these small outbreaks as overhyped blips — they see them as bullets dodged.
The summary, I suppose, is this: H5N1 probably won’t evolve 1916-like virulence. But, unlike most ‘flu strains, it *could.* And if we wait until it *does,* there will be very little that we can do to control it. And that would likely have have worldwide health & economic consequences far outweighing the not-trivial costs of preparing for a threat that never materializes.
So, after all of this, I guess my question is: do you really think that H5N1 is just media fearmongering, and if so, why? Because I really do not understand.
Dr. Bubbles, the flaw in your argument is the “could”.
Lots of things COULD happen.
We don’t have cause to create a panic about things that COULD happen.
A widespread virulent strain of H5N1 isn’t even likely, unless you take the very, very, very long view of it. Long like maybe generations from now.
“There is no way of knowing,” you say. No way of knowing is no rational basis for the kind of fear that has been provoked about the bird flu epidemic (an epidemic that does not exist!).
We have no way of knowing, after all, that aliens from Mars will not descend from the skies and eat us all for dinner this evening. Really, there is no way of knowing that. I’m not going to worry about that, and I don’t think it makes sense for us to devote massive government spending to counter the Martian invasion that, after all, COULD take place this evening.
We need a better rationale for action than the coulds and admissions of ignorance that you’ve admitted. We need proof that there is a serious likelihood of danger to significant numbers of human lives. So far, that proof is lacking.
Why is it so puzzling to you that I’m not willing to go along with the fear and hype when there’s no proof that it’s needed?
I find it puzzling because, to me, the way that H5N1 is being managed is more an example of governmental dereliction of duty (as in pre-Sept. 11 “anti-terrorism” and post-Katrina New Orleans) than of governmental manipulation by fear.
I guess I have trouble with your opinion (as expressed) in two respects. One is that you seem to be engaging in some hyperbole yourself, writing of “panic” and “fear that has been provoked”. I am in the DC metro area, and I have not seen any panic since 11 Sept. 2001 (and that includes our subway system on the day of the London bombings), nor any particular fear about H5N1. Now, granted, the media do emphasize the scary parts of H5N1, because scary sells. But that’s the media, not the government, not the people, and not the scientists. Even in SE Asia people aren’t panicked (which is a good thing, because panic would just make controlling any outbreak that much more difficult).
Still, most epidemiologists (though not all — as Dover, Penna., should have illustrated, there’s no 100% scientific consensus on anything) are very worried about the potential virulence of H5N1. And they are worried about it in the short term (a few years), too, *not* the long term. The probability is, in fact, that the longer we go without a virulent outbreak, the less likely it is that there will be one at all (at least for H5N1).
So it’s hard for me to reconcile your apparently unqualified rejection of the need for any concern with the strong but measured concerns being expressed the epidemiologists in the scientific media.
The second aspect of your opinion that gives me difficulty is your apparent attitude toward scientific methods. When you say that “We need a better rationale for action than the coulds and admissions of ignorance that you’ve admitted,” I wonder if you recognize the degree to which science deals in probability, or that there are inherent, inescapable uncertainties in science. It’s clear that you expect of a certain degree of precision in scientific predictions, but it’s not at all clear how much precision you want (surely you wouldn’t defend the proposition that unless scientists know everything about a topic, they don’t know anything useful about it?). While there is nothing wrong with this in principle, until I know what kind of precision you expect, I can’t tell if you’re just being unreasonably nitpicky (because, strictly speaking, *nothing* in the future can ever be predicted with 100% confidence), or dismissive (for whatever reason) of the actual circumstances of H5N1, or whether you actually have a substantive objection. For example, you say that “A widespread virulent strain of H5N1 isn’t even likely, unless you take the very, very, very long view of it. Long like maybe generations from now,” which is the reverse of what the epidemiologists are saying. You also say that “We need proof that there is a serious likelihood of danger to significant numbers of human lives. So far, that proof is lacking,” but there’s enough proof to satisfy the epidemiologists, the government of Indonesia, and the World Health Organization (among many others). *Do* you disagree with the epidemiologists that H5N1 has a significant probability of becoming virulent? Do you think they are hyping it? And if so, on what basis? What do you know that they don’t?
All of which makes me wonder, do you make any distinction between the scientists’ concerns about H5N1 and mainstream-media reporting about it?
Dr. Bubbles, I don’t know how you can separate “the media” from “the people”.
I’m not rejecting the need for any concern. I’m rejecting the need for hyped up concern. Let the real problem of H5N1 be dealt with, just like we deal with other problems. But, I wrote this article in response to journalists, scientists, and politicians standing up in the public media and telling us all that there is a crisis, which there just isn’t. To me, hype about a crisis that doesn’t exist is outrageous. It’s fear mongering. It doesn’t lead to good policy.
I don’t expect scientists to have precise predictions about the future, if they can’t get them using their methods. I do expect scientists, if they don’t know what’s going to happen in the future, not to engage in campaigns to spread fear about what they don’t know. It’s irresponsible.
The truth is, too, that there has been some research showing that it is unlikely that H5N1 will mutate into a virulent form. Let me give you a couple links:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-04/10/content_4405933.htm
http://www.abc.net.au/rural/wa/content/2006/s1609355.htm
On the basis of reports like these, and the fact that year after year, the promised doom does not come, lead me to think that the threat of H5N1 has been greatly exaggerated.
It all seems more psychological than fact-based. Every argument I hear for how serious the crisis of bird flu is depends one at least two things, often many more, that COULD happen, but haven’t happened at all yet.
With respect to the Xinhua report about the British science advisor’s statement: did you know that there has been extensive criticism of the way the British gov’t collected samples when testing for the prevalence of H5N1 in birds in the UK? They apparently collected their samples in such a way that the virus would have degraded before the samples could have been tested for it. And, if I recall correctly, the samples they took (bird droppings, I think) aren’t very good for assessing viral infection. So the prevalence of H5N1 in the UK remains unknown, as far as most epidemiologists are concerned. Moreover, the Chinese are not disinterested: they are pushing, hard, the idea that wildfowl spread H5N1 to domestic poultry rather than the reverse, because if it’s true it would alleviate some of the pressure to control the poultry trade in China. China has also been less than forthcoming with evidence about H5N1′s prevalence in both human and bird populations in China. There have been some outbreaks among Chinese that look, circumstantially but suspiciously, like possible bird ‘flu outbreaks in people. The Chinese comment to the WHO was basically, ‘It wasn’t H5N1. You’ll have to trust us on that.’ So there’s potentially a great deal of significant H5N1 evolution going on in China that isn’t being monitored because China simply rejects the possibility for political reasons. You apparently don’t distinguish between the public and the media here; do you think it is reasonable to distinguish between the government and the media in China?
Also, it’s quite a stretch to call two comments to the press “research.” They are the opinions of two administrators, reported in fairly obscure sources. (It reminds me of how everything in “Weekly World News” happens in Ruralton, Farawaynia.) Granted, the Aussie appears to be an epidemiologist, but again, he’s only one, and he is in fact in the minority on this.
Furthermore, *nobody* has *promised* that H5N1 will become virulent. What they say is that there is a better-than-average chance that it will, AND that it has a much-better-than-average chance of being scary virulent like the 1916 ‘flu. Given that it is not materially possible to develop & distribute a vaccine within the timeframe of a scary-virulent outbreak, they want the politicians to start preparing, just to be on the safe side. And as far as I can tell, the politicians really aren’t doing much, at least not on this side of the world.
Honestly, I haven’t seen anything resembling fearmongering about this. Media sensationalism, yes; but not fearmongering. Nor have I seen anything like a scientific campaign to put the fear of Bird into people. *Where* is the fear? *Who* is afraid (aside from the epidemiologists)? Again, I grant you that the media sensationalize it: but the media are not stenographers for the scientific community (whatever they may do for the Republicans). (Have you any idea how often scientists think reporters mischaracterize — overhype, report claims that weren’t made, just plain get things wrong — their work?) If you want to conflate the media and the public in this case, fine; but it doesn’t do your argument any favors. H5N1 is not a matter of ideology, so the media can’t be telling the public what it already “knows.”
And I still wonder about your perception of scientific methods. When you say, “I do expect scientists, if they don’t know what’s going to happen in the future, not to engage in campaigns to spread fear about what they don’t know. It’s irresponsible,” I wonder what you think about predictions like, a 30% chance of a 1906 San Francisco-like earthquake in an urban area in California in the next century. That means there’s a 70% chance of one not happening in the next century. So are they fearmongering? And what of global warming? Climatological models are only as good as their programming, which is only as good as climatological knowledge, which is incomplete: climatologists think the consequences of global warming will be bad, but they aren’t sure just when and how bad it’ll get. So most of them are pushing for worst-case-scenario emissions adjustments. Is that fearmongering? On the timescale of the human lifespan, there is considerable lag between atmospheric and oceanic warming, so we may be doomed already, anyway. On the other hand, it seems that the Greenland ice sheets are not moving as quickly as had been modelled, for example. As with anything else, the scientists can say what is more and less likely, but they can’t *ever* say what *will* actually happen until it does (think hurricane-track forecasting, or just daily weather forecasting, only on a grander scale). So when do their efforts to raise public awareness become fearmongering?
Here’s another way of looking at it. There’s no reason to think that the sun *won’t* rise tomorrow morning. That doesn’t guarantee that it *will.* Or take your Martian invasion: although the probability is vanishingly small it must still be non-zero if it “could” happen, but there’s no *reason* to think it will happen. So while there’s no *guarantee* that H5N1 will turn virulent, there *is* reason to think that it *could* (maybe there’s even enough reason to think that it *will*). Then again, there’s probably reason to think that terrorists will kill people in DC, too, which also doesn’t mean they will. I know which of these concerns me most, though, and it’s not the terrorists (a terrorist attack is probably the most likely of the lot, but it doesn’t pose the greatest risk to to the individual).
But maybe we’ll just have to agree to disagree on this.