The National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq was released to the public today, August 23 2007. For anyone with a stake in the war in Iraq, and I think that directly or indirectly includes all of us, this makes for a sobering read, making clear how unclear U.S. intelligence is about the situation in Iraq, and making clear even through the fog of its messy observations what a mess this war of choice has created:
This assessment updates the January 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq
entitled, Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead; it has been prepared at
the direction of the Director of National Intelligence in response to a request from the
National Security Council. It provides the Intelligence Community’s analysis of the status
of the critical factors identified in the January Estimate that are driving Iraq’s security and
political trajectory. Using the January Estimate as a baseline, this update examines the
prospects for progress on the security and national reconciliation fronts over the next six to
12 months.…the level of overall violence, including attacks on and casualties among
civilians, remains high; Iraq’s sectarian groups remain unreconciled; AQI retains the
ability to conduct high-profile attacks; and to date, Iraqi political leaders remain
unable to govern effectively. There have been modest improvements in economic
output, budget execution, and government finances but fundamental structural
problems continue to prevent sustained progress in economic growth and living
conditions.We assess, to the extent that Coalition forces continue to conduct robust
counterinsurgency operations and mentor and support the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),
that Iraq’s security will continue to improve modestly during the next six to 12 months
but that levels of insurgent and sectarian violence will remain high and the Iraqi
Government will continue to struggle to achieve national-level political reconciliation
and improved governance. Broadly accepted political compromises required for sustained
security, long-term political progress, and economic development are unlikely to emerge
unless there is a fundamental shift in the factors driving Iraqi political and security
developments.ɉۢ Intra-Shia conflict involving factions competing for power and resources probably will
intensify as Iraqis assume control of provincial security. In Basrah, violence has
escalated with the drawdown of Coalition forces there. Local militias show few signs of
reducing their competition for control of valuable oil resources and territory.• The Sunni Arab community remains politically fragmented, and we see no prospective
leaders that might engage in meaningful dialogue and deliver on national agreements.• Kurdish leaders remain focused on protecting the autonomy of the Kurdish region and
reluctant to compromise on key issues.The IC assesses that the emergence of “bottom-up†security initiatives, principally
among Sunni Arabs and focused on combating AQI, represent the best prospect for
improved security over the next six to 12 months, but we judge these initiatives will only
translate into widespread political accommodation and enduring stability if the Iraqi
Government accepts and supports them.…The IC assesses that the Iraqi Government will become more precarious over the next
six to 12 months because of criticism by other members of the major Shia coalition (the
Unified Iraqi Alliance, UIA), Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and other Sunni and Kurdish
parties. Divisions between Maliki and the Sadrists have increased, and Shia factions have
explored alternative coalitions aimed at constraining Maliki.
• The strains of the security situation and absence of key leaders have stalled internal
political debates, slowed national decisionmaking, and increased Maliki’s vulnerability to
alternative coalitions.
• We judge that Maliki will continue to benefit from recognition among Shia leaders that
searching for a replacement could paralyze the government.
Population displacement resulting from sectarian violence continues, imposing burdens
on provincial governments and some neighboring states and increasing the danger of
destabilizing influences spreading across Iraq’s borders over the next six to 12 months.
The polarization of communities is most evident in Baghdad, where the Shia are a clear
majority in more than half of all neighborhoods and Sunni areas have become surrounded by
predominately Shia districts.
I have no idea what to positively conclude from this estimate. I don’t buy George W. Bush’s comparison of Iraq to Vietnam, but there are some apt parallels he didn’t mention yesterday. Primary in my mind is the SNAFU acronym: Situation Normal, All Fucked Up.
Ten pages of absolutely nothing. Written on a tenth grade level. Composed of common sense stuff you can read in any newspaper or hear at a coffeeshop.
So first, before the report we are reading here is written, there’s the TOR paper for Terms Of Reference that gets passed around the agencies–a “concept paper” that “defines key estimative questions”. This report doesn’t tell us what the questions were–just the answers.
Then we have all that explanation of the “likelihood” of something happening–such as the word “probably” means there is a greater chance than the word “unlikely”–do you really have to explain all that to tenth graders?–but after all that filler they never do get around to telling us which stuff has “low confidence” or “high confidence”.
Then in the last two paragraphs the tenth grade language is dropped and we see some bureaucratese about an “assessment” about changing the “counterinsurgency” role to a “support role for Iraqi forces” to prevent a safe haven etc. etc. Is that what the Terms Of Reference were about–why they asked for the report in the first place? Changing the role of the coalition troops? Assessment of the readiness of Iraqi troops to take a more active role?
Thanks but I’ll take my info from the NYT or the coffeeshop. But who writes these things? That’s the job I want.